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1. INTRODUCTION

Few Bilateral Trade Agreements ("BTAs") have the historic and longterm implications of the recently signed U.S)Vietnam agreement.' In fact,
this BTA constitutes not merely a trade agreement, but a statement that
Vietnam is finally ready to enter the world economy. Although Vietnam will
eventually reap substantial rewards from this action, Vietnam's current
regime may not be equipped to deal with the changes in store for it in the
near future.

B.S. 1999, North Carolina State University; J.D., May 2002, University of Miami School of
Law. The author wishes to thank Professor Linda Mabry, formerly of the University of Miami School
of Law and the Stanford University Law School, for her immeasurable guidance and insight in the
preparation of this comment.
I
Cf Ben Bradlee,Jr., Market Leninism-The Global Economy isForcing Hanoi to Tiptoe Down a Free
Market Track. But Can an Aging, Calcified Politburo Control the Speed of Change and Keep Business From
Rfonrning Itself Out of Business, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 30, 2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL
3324745.
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By way of background, it is good to note that BTAs are a relatively
common occurrence in today's interdependent world economy. 2 For
example, there are at least twenty-two BTAs currently in existence between
Japan and the United States alone.3 There are numerous reasons why
nations enter into these agreements with the United States. 4 Many of the
most developed nations want to market their products in the U.S., as well as
strengthen bonds with the most powerful nation in the world.' Less
developed countries hope these agreements will lead to Foreign Direct
Investment ("FDI") in their countries by providing investors with a sense of
security. 6 While Vietnam may have had these objectives in mind, it also
knows that the BTA will bring Vietnam one giant step
closer to being
7
allowed to join the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
BTAs are important to the U.S. as well. While in 1960, U.S. imports and
exports only totaled about 9% of GDP, that amount is now about 30%, and
should be around 40% by the year 2010.8 Additionally, 95% of the world's
consumers live outside of the U.S., 9 and American businesses obviously
would like to sell products in many of these foreign markets. In particular,
emerging markets in Latin America and Asia are growing four times faster
than our traditional export markets, making BTAs with countries such as
10
Vietnam integral to the U.S.' long-term economic strategy.
II. RECENT HISTORY OF U.S./VNIETNAM RELATIONS
What makes this agreement most startling is how far apart these
countries were just a few years ago. These two countries had almost no
official relationship until only about twelve years ago, and did not even
exchange ambassadors until 1997.11 Although BTA negotiations occurred

2

Alan P. Larson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic & Business Affairs, The Importance

of International Trade, Foreign Policy Town Meeting, Washington, DC (Nov. 15, 1996), available at
http://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/961115.html.
3

Id.

4

Cf.id.
Id.
6
See N.Y. TIMEs, U.S., Vietnam Reportedly Agree on Trade Accord; Analysts: Deal to Lower Tariffs
Could Spur U.S. Investment in Asian Nation Uuly 13, 2000).
7
See id.
8
See Larson, supra note 2.
9
Id.
5

10

See id.

1

See White House Press Secretary, Vietnam Bilateral TradeAgreement; Historic Strengthening of the

U.S.-Vietnam Relationship (July 13, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-usvietnamtrade_000713.html.,
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relatively recently, to fully understand the significance of this agreement, we
must begin our review about a quarter century ago.
It seems that no discussion of Vietnam can begin without mentioning the
Vietnam War. In fact, the search for the remaining American MIAs in
Vietnam was an issue in the BTA talks,'2 so the Vietnam War is where I shall
start as well. In 1973, the Paris Peace Accords were signed, ending the
hostilities between the U.S. and North Vietnam. 13 With the American
presence gone, Saigon fell in 1975, and the North Vietnamese communists
overthrew the South Vietnamese government, effectively reunifying the
country. 4 The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on July 2,
1976.'In 1977 and 1978, President Carter tried to open normalization talks with
Vietnam, but the talks ended in failure as President Carter decided to give
priority to normalization talks with China.' 6 In 1979, Vietnamese troops
invaded Cambodia, leading Chinese troops to invade Vietnam.' 7 At first
glance, some may find this to be surprising. Given the similar political
ideology of China and Vietnam, one might expect the two Southeast Asian
neighbors to be close allies. Instead, their proximity has led to numerous
relatively minor disputes, the result being a Vietnamese view of China as a
bully who will always be looking down upon the smaller country.
This period from the end of the American-Vietnam War until about 1985
is known in Vietnam as "the ten dark years," because it is thought of as a time
of continual war and widespread hunger.' 9 Vietnam's government
accidentally caused much of this hunger when it botched the buying and
selling of rice, causing some stockpiles to waste or spoil.2" This led to the

12

See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S.-Vietnam Trade

Relations: Jackson-Vanik Waiver, Fact Sheet (June 17, 2000), available at
httpVwww.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-vietnam-trade_990617.htm. Seealso Stanley 0. Roth, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Statement Before the House International Relations
Committee, Subcommittees on Asia-Pacific Affairs and International Economic Policy and Trade,
Washington,
DC
(Sept.
19,
2000),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/2000/00091 9_roth-hirc.html.
13
ASA & PACIFic REViEW WORLD OF INFORMATION, Vietnam: Country Profile (Sept. 6, 2000),
available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 26666831.
14

Id.

15

Id.

16

See Agence France-Presse, Key Dates in U.S.-Vietnamese Relations Since 1975 (Sept. 14, 2000),

available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 24710706.
17
See Roth, supra note 12.
18

SeeTHEECONOMISTINTELLIGENCEUNiT LTD., CountryForecastVietnam October2000Updater

(Oct. 9, 2000), availableat Westlaw, 2000 WL 28628065.
19
Bradlee, supra note 1.
Id.
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announcement in 1986 that running farms as a collective had failed." For
the first time, the Politburo (Vietnamese government) allowed farmers to
buy or lease the land they farmed, then keep and sell what they harvested.22
This new policy led to surprisingly positive results.
In December 1986, after recognizing the economic failure of the last ten
years and believing its recent rice success could be applied to other economic
problems, the Vietnamese government announced a new policy of Doi Moi,
or renovation.23 These reforms have also been referred to as MarketLeninism,
although experts point out that they were still more Lenin than market.
The reforms of 1986 were followed by the authorization of foreign
investment in 1987.25 By 1989, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia and
began seeking admission into regional organizations. 6 The U.S. government
saw this as a signal that Vietnam intended to play a positive role in the
regional security and economic liberalization of Southeast Asia. 7
Vietnam adopted a new constitution in 1992.28 One extraordinary aspect
of this constitution is an express guarantee that foreign investments shall not
be nationalized.9 In 1993, President Clinton authorized the United States
to support international lending for Vietnam. 30 He also decided to allow
U.S. firms to join in Vietnamese development projects.3' In 1994, Clinton
lifted the economic embargo to allow U.S. firms to export to Vietnam and
compete for business opportunities that had been closed.32
Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN")
in 1995. 33 That same year, the United States opened normal diplomatic
relations with Vietnam.-4 Bilateral Trade Agreement negotiations began in
1996, and ambassadors were exchanged in 1997.35 Former Congressman and

21

Id.
IId.

24

See id.
See id.

3

See White House Press Saeaty,supra note 11.

23

6

Id.
Id.
N'
See RichardJ. Rivard & Khanh Hoang Ta, Ihesfing in Vietnam, Bus, &ECON. REVIEWOF THE
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS (Jan. 1,2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL
10734666.
'9

Id.

3

White House Press Secretary, supra note 11.

31

Id.
Id.
Id.

32

33
34
5

Id.
Id.

20021
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POW Douglas "Pete" Peterson was chosen to be the U.S. Ambassador to
Vietnam.36
In 1998, Vietnam joined the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
("APEC") forum.37 Also in 1998, the United States granted Vietnam its first
waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 3 This waiver allowed expanded
U.S. export promotion and investment support programs to Vietnam. 39 The
of freedom of emigration.4° The
prerequisite for this waiver is a certification
41
waiver was renewed in subsequent years.
In 1999, the United States and Vietnam reached agreement on some key
provisions of the BTA.4 " In 2000, more provisions were agreed on, and a
tentative agreement seemed to have been made.43 Then Vietnam got cold
feet. Fear of the domestic political implications resulted in heavy resistance
from within the party, and there was a strong temptation to retreat from44
these risks and continue to hide behind its communist neighbor, China.
Ironically, it was China that convinced Vietnam to go through with the
BTA.4" The main way it did this was unintentional. Vietnam's view of
China as a bully and a county that will always view Vietnam as a subordinate
has caused Vietnam to feel a large amount of resentment towards China,
pushing it away from China and towards the United States."
The second way China encouraged the BTA was intentional. Chinese
advisors explained to Vietnamese officials that the party-state could survive
the concessions to the Americans.47 China's actions reinforced these words,
48
as at the time, China too was in the process of signing a BTA with the U.S.
Vietnamese officials soon decided to follow suit, and on July 13, 2000 the
BTA was signed. 9

3

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id.
See Charlene Barshefsky, Congressional Testimony on International Economic Policy and
Trade; U.S.-Vietnam Trade (Sept. 19, 2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 23832855.
41
Whdte House Press Secretary, supra note 11.
42
Id.
40

43

See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT LTD., supra note 18.

44

Id.

45

Id.

47

48

Id.
Id.
Id.

49

Id.
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HI. RATIFYING THE AGREEMENT
Although the pact enjoyed widespread support, ratification involved the
typical political hurdles. Vietnam publicly stated that it would not ratify the
BTA until after the U.S. did.' This substantially delayed the process,
especially considering that the U.S. Senate would not be able to address the
BTA until well into 2001.1
The main argument against U.S. ratification of the act was based on
humanitarian concerns.
One of the most outspoken critics was
Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL). Congresswoman RosLehtinen pointed out that "Vietnam is still one of the most repressive
countries in the world," and that "the Vietnam government continues to
systematically violate the human rights, civil liberties and religious freedom
of its people."5 2 While no one disputes these claims, the current Bush
Administration, as well as the Clinton Administration that negotiated the
deal, feels that a more proactive approach is the only way to achieve positive
change in Vietnam.53 Says U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky,
"Dealing with Vietnam will build international momentum.., for reform
within the country."'M Some of this potential positive change has already
occurred. Hopeful of improved relations with the U.S., Vietnam has allowed
over 500,000 Vietnamese to emigrate as refugees or immigrants to the U.S.55
Vietnam has also released some political prisoners to the U.S. as well as
repatriated approximately 300 possible sets ofAmerican soldier remains since
1993.56

Another argument in favor of the BTA is that we were alone in our
sanctions against Vietnam. s7 It would be one thing if an international
coalition had been applying pressure on the Vietnamese government, but that
was not the case. At the time of the BTA negotiations between the U.S. and
Vietnam, Vietnam had already signed BTAs with fifty-seven other countries
so

Id.

51

Cf Senate Oks Full Trade Ties with Vietnam..., PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 4,2001; The

Nation - LegislatorsAdvance Bush Trade Agenda ... , LA TIMES, Oct. 4,2001.

5
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, International Economic Policy and Trade: U.S.-Vietnam Trade,
Congressional Testimony (Sept. 19,2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 23832854.
53
See Barshefsky, supra note 40.
5
Id.
ss
Stanley Roth, The U.S.-Vietnam BilateralTrade Agreement and U.S. Policy in Vietnam (Sept. 19,
2000), availableat http'//www.state.gov/www/policyremarks/2000/000919_roth-hirc.html.
56
Id.
57
Cf ASIA PuLsE, Vietnam Strives to Obtain E.xport Value of US $38 BLN in 2010 (Sept. 7,2000),
available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 20947414.
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and territories.58 It had also achieved Most Favored Nation Status (what the
U.S. now refers to as Normal Trade Relations) with seventy-two countries
and territories3' While Vietnam would obviously still prefer to trade with
the U.S. than not to, any punishment the U.S. dished out was not as effective
as one backed by a coalition of countries would have been.
In the end, the United States Senate chose to pass the measure, by a vote
of eighty-eight to twelve, on October 3, 2001.' o This was partly due to its
bipartisan support, 61 including the influence exerted by President Bush 62 and
former President Clinton, but may largely be due to the efforts of the
Vietnam veteran Congressmen. Senators Bob Kerrey (D-NE), Chuck Hagel
(R-NE), andJohn McCain (R-AZ) have all been outspoken advocates of the
BTA. 3 This
group's influence was simply too much for the dissenters to
64
overcome.

Vietnam's National Assembly ratified the agreement on November 28,
2001.65 However, it garnered only 64.3% of the vote, enough for approval,
but a clear indication that many members of "the old guard" are still very
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
See Senator Chuck Grassley, Metorandun: Vietnan Trade Agreement (Oct. 3, 2001), availableat

2001 WL 5422507; Nick Anderson, The Nation LegislatorsAdvance Bush TradeAgenda Politics: Senate Passes
U.S. - Vietnam Accord. A Bill to Give the President 'Fast Track' Negotiating Powers Faces Tougher Going in the
House, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4,2001; Leon Hadar, U.S. SenateApproves Trade Accord with Vietnam, BUSINESS
TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 6,2001.
61
See Matt Kelley, House Panel Hears Testimony on Trade Pact With Vietnam, OMAHA WORLDHERALD, Sept. 20,2000.
61
See The Associated Press, Candidates on the Vietnam Trade (Oct. 17, 2000), available at
Westlaw, 2000 WL 28612849, for Bush's statement including, "Isupport the trade agreement with
Vietnam. I believe expanded trade with Vietnam will help the forces of economic and political reform to
take root and grow." This has added importance because it is totally within the President's discretion
whether to sign the annual waiver oftheJackson-Vanik amendment. See 4hite House PressSecretary, supra
note 11.
63
While all three of the Senators have influence, only Senators McCain and Hagel voted on the
BTA, as Senator Bob Kerrey retired before the current Congressional session began. Id.
Although their efforts to block the ratification of the BTA were unsuccessful, the dissenters
have forged on, introducing a separate measure, "The Vietnam Human Rights Bill," which links nonhumanitarian aid to progress on human rights. See Michael Mathes, Hanoi Attempts to Sway Human Rights
Bill, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 19, 2001. The bill passed the United States House of
Representatives on September 6, 2001, and as of the time of this comment, it is unclear whether it will
be approved by the Senate. See id; see also, Vietnam: Radio QuotesDaily Report Against U.S. Vietnan Human
RightsAct, BBC MONITORING (Sept. 27,2001), available at 2001 WL 28563563, as the Senate has already
refused to vote on the Vietnam Human Rights Bill on at least one occasion. See Vietnan: Government
Welcomes U.S. Senate Approval of BilateralTradeAgreenent, BBC MONITORING (Oct. 5, 2001), availableat
2001 WL 28779203.
65
ASIA PULSE, Bilateral Trade Pact Expeaed to Boost US Investment in Vietnam (Dec. 5, 2001),
availableat 2001 WL 26607919.
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hesitant to embrace a free market economy.66 On December 10, 2001,
Vietnamese Trade Minister Vu Khoan and United States Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick exchanged ratification documents, making
the BTA effective from that point on.67
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT

The BTA is divided into six substantive chapters: 1) Market access for
industrial goods and farm products; 2) Intellectual property; 3) Trade in
services; 4) Investment; 5) Business facilitation; and 6) Transparency.'
A. Chapter 1- Market Access for Goods
Vietnam committed to general trade principles consistent with WTO
practices, including reducing tariffs and abolishing non-tariff restrictions
such as quotas. These provisions will ensure trading rights for foreign and
Vietnamese businesses. 9 The commitments include:
* Trading Rights: Vietnam will grant, for the first time, rights for
both Vietnamese and foreign businesses to import and export,
generally phased in over 3-6 years;70
* National Treatment: Vietnam will apply national treatment for
imports in areas including standards, taxes and commercial
71
dispute settlement;
* Tariffs: Vietnam guarantees Most Favored Nation level tariffs
for U.S. goods, and cuts tariffs on many agricultural and
manufactured goods of interest to American exporters by a third
to a half, from current levels averaging approximately 20%;72

66

SouTH CHINA MORNING POST, Tough Taskfor Hanoi to Pry Economy Open... (Dec. 1,2001),

available at 2001 WL 29886298.
67
BBC MONITORING, Vietnam-US Trade Pact Officially Takes Elect on 10 December (Dec. 12,
2001), availableat 2001 WL 31475036.
68
See Barshefsky, supra note 40. The agreement actually has seven chapters. However, chapter
seven deals merely with details such as the exact time when the BTA will go into effect. Cf Vietnam-US
Trade Pact Officially Takes Effect on 10 December, BBC MONITORING (Dec. 12,2001), available at 2001 WIL
31475036. This segment of the comment will only address the BTA's six substantive chapters.
(9
See Barshefsky, supra note 40.
70
Id.
71
Id.
7-

Id.
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" Non-Tariff Measures: Vietnam agrees to eliminate all
quantitative restrictions on a range of industrial and agricultural73
products over a period of 3-7 years, depending on the product;
• Import Licensing: Vietnam will eliminate all discretionary
4
import licensing, in accordance with the WTO agreement;
* Customs Valuation and Customs Fees: Vietnam will comply
with WTO rules within two years. These rules include using
transactional value for customs valuation and limiting customs
fees to the cost of services rendered; 5
* Technical Standards and Phytosanitga Measures: WTO
standards will be met, including the application of technical
regulations and sanitary76 and phytosanitary measures on a
national treatment basis;
* State Trading: State trading will be carried out in accordance
with WTO rules. This requires state trading enterprises to only
make sales and purchases in accordance with commercial
considerations. n

B. Chapter2 - Intellectual PropertyRights
Vietnam will implement WTO-level patent and trademark protection
within one year of ratification, and copyright and trade secret protection
within eighteen months after the BTA is ratified.78 It will also take further
measures to strengthen intellectual property protection in other areas,
including the protection of encrypted satellite signals. 9
C. Chapter3 - Trade in Services
Vietnam accepts the rules of the WTO's General Agreement on Trade
in Services.80 Vietnam also guarantees protection for the existing rights of all

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77
78
79
so

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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foreign service providers in Vietfiam 8' and makes specific commitments in
numerous sectors, including:
* Telecommunications: Vietnam will accept the principles of the
WTO's Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper, requiring
a pro-competitive regulatory regime and cost-based
interconnection fees. s2 It will also make commitments to
liberalize the basic and value-added telecommunications
markets.8 3
* Financial Services: Vietnam agrees to the General Agreement on
Trade in Services financial annex, and made specific
commitments in the insurance, banking, leasing comply
provider, and securities sectors.84
* Professional: Vietnam made specific commitments for the legal,
8
accounting, architectural, and engineering professions. 1
Vietnam will allow 100% U.S. equity in firms relating to these
four areas.' Law firms will be given five-year renewable licenses
and will be permitted to consult on Vietnamese laws.87
American accounting, architectural, and engineering firms will
be allowed to provide services to foreign invested firms for the
first two years, and to Vietnamese firms afterwards.88
* Audio Visual: U.S. firms will be permitted to form joint
ventures with Vietnamese firms in the film production and
distribution industry, as well as provide motion picture
projection services. 89
* Distribution: American wholesale distribution firms will be
allowed to make joint ventures with Vietnamese firms for the
first six years, after which time 100% U.S. equity will be
permitted.' All U.S. retailers wishing to participate in the

81

Id.

82
93
84
85
86
88

Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

89

Id.

90

See id.

87
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Vietnamese market will be allowed to open one outlet, with
further approvals on a case-by-case basis.9'
D. Chapter4 - Investment
Vietnam's commitments will ease investment, reduce paperwork and
ensure national treatment for almost all foreign investors.12 These
commitments include protections against expropriation of U.S. investments
in Vietnam, and the right to repatriate profits and conduct other financial
transfers on a national treatment basis. 93 Vietnam will also phase out local
content requirements and export performance requirements within five
years, as well as end almost all investment screening and discriminatory
• - 94
pricing.
Government controls and screening requirements for joint
ventures will also be reduced. 95
E. Chapter5 - Business Facilitation
Vietnam will guarantee the right for Americans to conduct routine
business practices, such as setting up offices, advertising, and conducting

market studies.96
F. Chapter6 - Transparencyand Right to Appeal
This section may be the most important. For the first time, Vietnam will
now provide advance notice of all laws, regulations and other administrative
procedures relating to any matter covered in the agreement, publish all laws
and regulations, and inform the public of effective dates and government
contact points.9' Specific commitments include:
All laws governing issues covered
in the agreement must be
98
made public and readily available;

91

Id.

9

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95
%

Id.

9

Id.

98

Id.

Id.
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•

Vietnam will designate an official journal in which all such
measures will be published;99
• Vietnam will commit to uniform, impartial and reasonable
application of all laws, regulations and administrative
procedures;'
* Vietnam will form administrative orjudicial tribunals for review
and correction of all matters covered in the agreement, and
afford the right to appeal relevant decisions.'0 ' Notice of
decisions upon appeal and reasons for appellate decisions will be
provided in writing. 2
V. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR VIETNAM

A. Why This Agreement is Necessary
This agreement is one large step towards Vietnam joining the World
Trade Organization (WTO),'0 3 and Vietnam is hopeful that the BTA's
ratification will ensure Vietnam's admission into the WTO in the near
future.1 4 The WTO is a network of agreements between all of its members,
currently 144 in number, that facilitates international trade."' 5 The effect of
joining the WTO is similar to simultaneously creating BTAs with 143 other
countries. 06 This is expected to have a very positive effect on the Vietnamese
economy, which has been growing at a very mediocre rate for the last fifteen
'07
years.
The BTA also formally indoctrinates Vietnam into the overwhelming
number of countries to whom the U.S. has granted Normal Trade Relations
(NTR). 8 NTR (formerly called Most Favored Nation treatment)

99
101

Id.
Id.
Id.

I2

Id.

100

See Jim Lobe, Trade-U.S./Vietnam: Landmark Trade Accord Signed, INTER PRESS SERVICE (July
13, 2000), availableat Westlaw, 2000 WL 4091990.
104
BBC MONITORING, Vietnamese PremierHopes Visit by WTO Headto Help 'Quick'Accession (Dec.
103

3, 2001), availableat 2001 WL 31089068.
105
See http://www.wto.org.
106

Id.

107

See Bradlee, supra note 1.

108

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Tough Task for Hanoi to Pry Economy Open... (Dec. 1.2001),

available at 2001 WL 29886298. Vietnam was one of only six countries that do not receive normal trade
relations treatment from the U.S. The others are Laos, Cuba, North Korea, Afghanistan and Serbia. See
Charlene Barshefsky's Congressional Testimony on International Economic Policy and Trade; U.S.-
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substantially reduces the tariff on textiles imported from Vietnam to the
U.S.,' 0 9 giving American textile makers and retailers hope that American
industry will soon have the same advantages as their European counterparts,
who import an estimated $100 million-plus worth of apparel annually from
Vietnam. " Vietnam's "large population, rock-bottom labor costs and a
workforce that is skilled in the needle trade" have even led many retailers to
refer to it as "the next China." 1 In fact, analysts have also said that Vietnam,
with reduced tariffs and heavy foreign investment, could ship up to $2 billion
"Big Five" of
in apparel a year to the U.S., placing it among the so-called
112
Mexico, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea.
Vietnam also recognizes that NTR status with the U.S. will not only help
Vietnam's textile industry, but other, more undeveloped areas of its economy
as well." 3 Vietnam expects technology and management skills to flow into
Vietnam from the U.S., things which are necessary if Vietnam is to make a
successful transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy.
B. Can Vietnam Possibly Become Another Asian Tiger?
Many experts agree that with the help of increased U.S. trade, Vietnam's
economy should improve dramatically." 5 The main point of contention is
how long it will take for this progress to take effect. 1 6 Some experts, like
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee, believe Vietnam will not truly become an
Asian Tiger until the old guard leaders of the Politburo leave power, possibly
many years from now. 1 7 However, prominent financial experts disagree
with Lee's analysis." 8 These experts are notjust from Wall Street. They are
from Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, France, even Singapore,

Vietnam Trade (Sept. 19, 2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 1520568.
109
See Jim Ostroff, U.S.-Vietnam Accord Key to Low-Price Inports; TradeAgreement Between Former
Enemies Will Open Borders to Goods, Services, DAILY NEWS RECORD (July 14, 2000), available at Westlaw,
2000 WL 9062142.
Id.
10o
"'

Id.

112

Id.
See Bradlee, supra note 1.
See id.
See Rivard & Ta, supra note 28.
See id.
See David Lamb, Lee Kuan Yetv Asia's Tight Ship' Weathers a Crisis and Critics of HarshRule, L.A.

113
114
115
116
117

TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999.
118
See Rivard & Ta, supra note 28.
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and they believe an Asian Tiger economy is right around the corner for
Vietnam.' 1 9

For years, Wall Street has been convinced that Vietnam has Asian Tiger
potential. 2 ' This belief led to annual FDI of more than $2 billion from the
United States (and $8.6 billion overall) during the mid-1990s. 12' This
number fell to only $500 million in 1999 (and $1.6 billion overall), as
investors expressed frustration with the numerous bureaucratic and legal
barriers imposed by the Vietnamese government. 22 The new BTA should
revitalize the fickle investors, leading to a potential explosion in FDI. 12 "The
psychological pendulum is beginning to swing back. With the trade
agreement, people are saying that now the fundamental direction is positive,"
says Tony Foster, managing partner for Vietnam of the law firm
Freshfields. 124
Despite the investors' enthusiasm, there are signs that Vietnam's
transition to a more open economy could be a bumpy one. The Politburo's
schizophrenic actions in recent years are a cause of this concern. One
example occurred in 1996, when after literally pleading for FDI, the
Vietnamese government suddenly became paranoid of Westernization, and
ordered all billboards advertising products such as Coca Cola and Heineken
beer taken down. 12 It then decreed that English words on signs could not
be larger than Vietnamese words. 6
This division within the Politburo was summed up by ThomasJ. Vallely,
director of the Vietnam programs at Harvard University's Institute for
International Development, shortly before the BTAwas signed when he said:
Vietnam and the U.S. are not negotiating a trade agreement.
Vietnam is negotiating a trade agreement with itself: One side
the other
wonders whether they shouldjoin the world economy, and
2
side wonders how they should join the world economy. 1

119

See id.

1-10

See Jim Lobe, Trade- U.S./Vietnam: Landmark Trade Accord Signed, INTER PRESS SERVICE (July

13, 2000), available at Westlaw, 2000 WL 4091990.
121

12
2000.
123
124

Id.

See Leon Hadar, U.S., Vietnam Sign HistoricTradeAccord, BUSINESS TIMES (Singapore),July 15,
See Bradlee, supra note 1.
See Stan Sesser, Vietnam - A tradepact with the U.S. is one of several signs that the pace of refonn is

picking up, THE ASIAN WALL STREETJOURNAL (Oct. 23, 2000).
125
See Bradlee, supra note 1.
126

See id.

1-

See id.

BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT

2002]

Despite the mistakes made in the past, the signing of the BTA and its
ratification by the Vietnamese legislature show that the pro-free market
faction of the Politburo has prevailed. Public statements by prominent
Vietnamese officials reinforce the view that the government is focused on
entering the world economy.' 2 Some of these statements are aimed at the
Vietnamese people themselves, in an attempt to prepare them for the
challenges to come.2 9 Nguyen Dinh Luong, the head of Vietnam's
Department of European and American Affairs as well as Vietnam's chief
negotiator with the U.S., warned his fellow citizens that they must prepare
to switch from an agricultural to an industrial based economy in order to
compete internationally. 3 ° Says Luong, "The world will become a united
playing field. No nation can stand outside of this playing field as ongoing
globalization is rapidly realized." 3'
13 2
Like many countries, Vietnam has a problem with corruption.
However, this has become another example of the Politburo's sincere efforts
at change. The government has cracked down on corruption, and even
proclaimed a mandatory death sentence for those caught stealing more than
$27,000 from the state.' 33 So far, at least sixteen people have been sentenced
to death under this new law. 34 The government has also allowed the press
more freedom in reporting official corruption.'363 5 These news stories have
become another deterrent to corrupt officials.'
Vietnam's infrastructure is also a problem, although it is more of a
nuisance to foreigners than a roadblock to economic progress.' 37 In Ho Chi
Minh City, for example, there are almost no stop lights, requiring a
pedestrian wishing to cross the constantly busy streets to "plunge in and let
them avoid you, rather than vice versa."' 38 Hopefully, this type of problem
will be remedied once more money starts flowing into Vietnam.
Surprisingly, another reason for economic optimism is actually Vietnam's
current monumental inefficiency.' 39 The 6,000 current state-owned
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enterprises employ less than 5% of the workforce, yet control 70% of
Vietnam's financial and natural resources.140 They also have access to a
disproportionate share of investment capital, even though only a third make
a profit.' As the BTA reforms take hold, these resources will be freed up so
that they can be used much more efficiently, leading to a substantially
stronger Vietnamese economy. 142 This progression will be accelerated by an
amendment to Vietnam's constitution that was passed in December 2001.43
This amendment calls for the private sector to be treated equally to the state
sector, and it is hoped that this will alleviate the preferential treatment banks
have given to state-run enterprises over private-sector businesses.'"
C. Can the Socialist Government Coexist with a More Open Market?
Singapore provides an indication that it is possible for a socialist regime
to survive the liberalization of its country's market. 4 ' If one person can be
146
most credited for Singapore's success, it is Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew.
Lee Kuan Yew has played a critical role in Singapore's changes, first as an
independence leader forty years ago, then as prime minister, and now as
senior minister, a powerful Cabinet post created just for him. 14 Senior
Minister Lee has long argued that the rule of law is more important than
democracy in a free market.'48 Lee also believes people are willing to forego
a large degree of Western-style democracy as long as they are provided with
economic opportunity and political stability. 149 So far, in Singapore at least,
this view appears to be correct. 150 However, Lee also believes that individual
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liberties are less important than the welfare of society as a whole.'" 52Of
course, this view has drawn criticism from many human rights activists.
Even Communist stalwarts such as China are now discussing the feasibility
of the so-called socialist market economy. 1 3 Whether Market Leninism can truly
succeed remains to be seen, but the willingness of a super power such as
China to accept this plan of action is strong evidence that it may.15
Senior Minister Lee thinks Vietnam will achieve major economic success
someday, but not anytime soon. Says Lee:
I fear.. .Vietnam will have to wait, for a change in generations. The
present leaders developed an expertise in fighting an overpowering
enemy by guerrilla tactics. In other words, let their men ambush the
enemy, harass them and wear them down, and they win. But to
rebuild the modern economy, or to build a new one is more difficult
and requires an understanding of the modern world.'
Glaring statistics illustrate the generation gap Lee mentioned. Over half
of the Vietnamese population is under age twenty-five. 6 Perhaps even more
striking, 85% is under age forty. 157 As for the other 15%, says Ambassador
Peterson, "Their whole lives were war. They had no clue that while they
to interdependence.
were under a rock, the world redefined 1independence
58
But that 15% controls the government.,
Senior Minister Lee also points to the stubbornness of the Vietnamese
leaders as a cause for the delay. 159 In 1992, Lee advised Vietnam to take
advantage of the Vietnamese living abroad, who could bring back their
knowledge and connections.'60 However, Vietnam has not made a strong
effort to do this. 161 Lee suspects this is because the Vietnamese leaders fear
these people will bring their "dangerous ideas" back with them. 162
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Although they agree with Lee's generation gap observation, some experts,
including Ambassador Peterson, predict the change in attitudes will happen
sooner rather than later. 63 U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Peterson points to
the "cybercafe phenomenon" as the epitome of the current changes
underway, stating:164
Thousands of young Vietnamese are accessing the internet at scores
ofcybercafes across the country. They are obtaining and exchanging
information, and many are doing so by finding innovative ways to
circumvent the layered firewalls conservative elements of Vietnam's
government have placed on internet access. This story reflects the
thirst of Vietnam's young people for a tangible connection to the
world beyond their borders; I think it also underscores the
tremendous future export and investment
opportunities available to
65
America's technology companies.'
Another reason why these political changes could come soon is the
political ideology, or lack thereof, of the general population. Only two
million of the seventy-seven million Vietnamese are Communist party
members. 66 Most of these members live in Hanoi.' 67 In other places, like
Ho Chi Minh City, less than 2% of the citizens belong to the party.' 6 The
overwhelming popularity of the Doi Moi reforms169provides further evidence
of the general population's appetite for freedom.
These statistics might lead someone to wonder how the Politburo stays
in power at all. The answer is simply nationalism. The ruling party is tightly
associated with the improbable victories over the French and the Americans,
glorious victories the general population remembers with a large amount of
pride. 70 However, as these victories fade further into the past, this source of
political power will fade with them.
Thus, the question is not whether socialism can coexist with a free
market economy. Singapore has already shown it to be possible. The
question is whether this particular socialist government can coexist with a
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free market economy, and the answer to that question is probably not for
long.
VI. WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The most obvious benefit to the United States is the right to do business
with the world's 14th most populous country, 7 ' but selling goods and
services to the eighty million Vietnamese consumers 7 2 was not the only
reason to ratify the BTA. One of the United States' major strategic goals in
Asia is to encourage a "stable and cohesive Southeast Asia." 173 Strengthening
ties with one of the
few non-NTR nations is an excellent way for the U.S.
174
goal.
this
meet
to
As far as the economic benefits are concerned, many American
businesses will be aided by the act. Obviously, those most effected will be
the companies that choose to invest in Vietnam. As far as these businesses
are concerned, the BTA chapter concerning judicial transparency is
particularly important. In the 1990's many investors left Vietnam because of
the unfair legal proceedings that took place. 175 Whenever a non-Vietnamese
company had a legal dispute with a Vietnamese enterprise, the court would
almost always decide in the Vietnamese entity's favor. 76 Worst, Vietnam's
courts would not state a reason for deciding any particular case the way it did,
and would not reduce any opinion to writing t 77 Now that the BTA has been
ratified, those days are over. The BTA makes specific provisions for legal
transparency that should soothe the fears of U.S. businesses burned by
Vietnam's past legal chicanery.
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VII. CONCLUSION

From a U.S. perspective, the question of whether Vietnam's socialist
regime can survive a more free market presents a possible win-win situation.
If the government stumbles after the economic reforms are already in place,
there is a possibility of a democratic revolution, such as those seen in Eastern
Europe at the end of the Cold War. Even if communism continues in
Vietnam long after these reforms take place, the U.S. will have gained a
valuable trading partner in a growing region. Additionally, the strengthened
bond between the two countries will grant the U.S. more influence on the
Vietnamese government than it otherwise would have.
From the Vietnamese point of view, they have come a long way in a short
time. While Vietnam still has far to go, the groundwork has been laid for
continued progress. The only question is whether Vietnam will advance so
quickly as to leave behind the old guard of leaders who are currently setting
this groundwork in place. For some members of the ruling party, this fear
has caused hesitation. However, for the Vietnamese population as a whole,
97% of whom are not party members,179 the possible eventual collapse of the
socialist party and a chance for democracy to take root may be of even greater
benefit to the people than the economic advancement that can be expected
to occur in the very near future.
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